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Abstract-With Dynamic Home Agent Address Discovery 
(DHAAD), as specified in Mobile IPv6, a Mobile Node can 
discover the address of a suitable Home Agent on the home link. 
However, DHAAD suffers from security problems as the 
signaling is not authenticated nor integrity protected. The IETF 
has defined SEcure Neighbor Discovery that is providing security 
for the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery protocol, based on several 
asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms. It is shown that these 
mechanisms can also be used to secure DHAAD to increase its 
level of protection and to provide resistance against attacks. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) protocol [9] is the standard 
global mobility management protocol of the IETF that has 
been adopted by 3GPP, 3GPP2 or Next Generation Networks 
in general. 
The Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support protocol [5] 
extends the MIPv6 specification to support a Mobile Router 
(MR). Unfortunately, NEMO did not specify Route 
Optimization (RO) so far. The Car2Car communication 
consortium and the aviation industry are interested in 
deploying IP networks in general and NEMO in particular. 
Therefore, a solution to the NEMO RO problem has to be 
found as this is a deployment obstacle for these industries. 
One of the proposed solutions to solve the NEMO RO 
problem is the Global Home Agent to Home Agent protocol 
[15]. This protocol extends the Home Agent (HA) concept 
from having a single entity on the home link towards several 
geographically distributed Home Agents (perhaps world-wide). 
A problem that has to be solved within this context is locating 
the closest HA to the Mobile Node (MN) or Mobile Router 
(MR), for which the Anycast based Dynamic Home Agent 
Address Discovery mechanism, as specified in [9], is a 
reasonable candidate. The semantics of Anycast are suitable 
for this task as data is routed to the “nearest” destination, with 
distance being defined by the routing metrics. 
MIPv6 Dynamic Home Agent Address Discovery (DHAAD) 
specifies that a Mobile Node may discover the address of a 
suitable Home Agent on the home link. Due to the fact that the 
message exchange can be misused and the transported 
information is important for a MN/MR (it contains the HA 
addresses), it becomes necessary to secure this DHAAD 
signaling, which is currently not the case for [9]. One way of 
improving the security is presented within this paper, and we 
argue that asymmetric cryptography provides the necessary 
means to accomplish this task. 
A comparable proposal has already been presented in [13], 
but it relies on shared secrets and therefore inherently suffers 
from the problems of scalability (e.g. how to distribute shared 
secrets among all MN-HA pairs). An asymmetric 
cryptographic method is to be preferred. The SEcure Neighbor 
Discovery protocol [2] provides mechanisms that can be 
reused for this purpose. Therefore, our proposal is based on 
asymmetric mechanisms, reusing parts of SEND, increasing 
the level of protection for the DHAAD signaling between MN 
and HA. The parts of DHAAD that relate to Home Agents 
keeping track of available neighboring Home Agents is not 
covered by our proposal. It is assumed that the home link is 
physically secured against attackers trying to attach to this link. 
The presented mechanisms are applicable to both a MN and 
a MR, but for simplicity we will from now on only use the 
notion MN, although this is not excluding a MR from using 
these enhancements – in the opposite, from the aviation 
industry point of view Network Mobility [5] is far more usable 
than Host Mobility as in MIPv6 [9]. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Sections  II 
and  III provide an overview of DHAAD, its problems and 
proposals for enhancing its security that have been presented 
so far. In Section  IV we define the requirements for our 
solution and in Section  V we introduce SEcure Neighbor 
Discovery (SEND) that is partially reused to increase the level 
of security for the Neighbor Discovery Protocol. In Section  VI 
we provide an overview of all options that we are using from 
DHAAD and SEND. In Section  VII the proposed mechanisms 
to secure DHAAD, based on SEND, are presented. We 
investigate the signaling overhead in Section  VIII and finally 
analyze the advantages and disadvantages of our proposal in 
Section  IX. 
 
This work is partially funded by the European Commission through the 
NEWSKY project under contract no. 37160.
II. DHAAD 
The DHAAD procedure [9] consists of a request-response 
signaling: the MN creates an ICMP Home Agent Address 
Discovery Request Message and sends it to the Mobile IPv6 
Home Agents Anycast address that is constructed from the 
home subnet prefix, with the current Care-of Address (CoA) 
of the MN as source address of the request. The HA that 
receives the message responds with an ICMP Home Agent 
Address Discovery Reply Message that includes a list of 
available Home Agents on the home link, sent to the CoA of 
the MN. 
DHAAD was considered insufficient for bootstrapping 
Mobile IP, which is – in general - a procedure to dynamically 
configure a Mobile Node (i.e. MIPv6 requires a MN to be pre-
configured with a valid Home Address, a Home Agent 
Address, a Home Network Prefix, and cryptographic material 
to establish a Security Association (SA) with its Home Agent). 
The reason why DHAAD was considered insufficient is that a 
MN needs to be preconfigured with several of the parameters 
mentioned before. In addition bootstrapping based on 
DHAAD also prevents effective load balancing between 
different HAs if an operator runs several home links and 
would like do distribute the MNs among these. Hence separate 
bootstrapping specifications [7, 4] were defined to address 
these deficiencies. Either DNS or DHCPv6 may be used to 
retrieve the address of the HA and subsequently assign the 
MN a Home Network Prefix and a Home Address to allow 
establishment of a Security Association between MN and HA. 
Additionally, DHAAD suffers from the security point of 
view. Without any already established Security Association no 
confidentiality nor integrity or any means to authenticate the 
MN, which is the sender of the ICMP Home Agent Address 
Discovery Request Message, can be provided. The same is 
valid for the reply message. The content of the Home Agent 
Address Discovery Reply Message cannot be integrity 
protected and the sender cannot be authenticated as well (that 
ought to be a valid HA). 
Nevertheless, DHAAD is still useful if Home Agents are 
not operated by a Mobility Services Provider offering 
DHCPv6 or DNS services. Additionally, DHAAD is 
reasonable if the Global Home Agent to Home Agent protocol 
[15] is deployed, where modified DHAAD signaling could be 
used to locate the Home Agent that is topologically closest to 
the Mobile Nodes current point of attachment. 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
In [13] the authors suggest to use a shared secret key 
between the HA and the MN that is then used to calculate a 
hash value for both authenticating the sender of the message 
and verifying the integrity of the message itself. 
In the DHAAD request (shown in Fig. 2), a new Mobile 
Node Identifier Option is used to carry the identity of the MN; 
in addition the already existing identifier field, set to a random 
value, is extended from 16 to 24 bits (using the reserved bits 
for this purpose) to lower the probability of identifier 
collisions. The identifier field is used for ensuring protection 
against replay attacks, as the reply message that matches the 
request has to use the same value in its own identifier field. 
Although this works for MIPv6, it does not necessarily 
work for NEMO Basic Support where one bit from the 
reserved ones is used to set a router flag to indicate that the 
sender is looking for a HA that supports Mobile Routers. 
The authors suggest obtaining the shared key via pre-
configuration or the bootstrapping mechanism. In both cases 
the complexity of managing a high number of keys remains a 
major problem. If a unique (MN, HA) shared key is used, as 
suggested by the authors, its application in a Global HA to HA 
[15] network layout with many geographically distributed 
HAs becomes problematic, as each (MN, HA) key pair has to 
be distributed and stored at all Home Agents. Given the 
potentially high number of MNs for the Car2Car or for the 
aviation scenario, a scalability problem would have to be 
expected. For the latter, forecasts expect 15.5 to 18.9 million 
flights in Europe for the year 2025, which corresponds to 
approximately 50.000 flights per day if a uniform distribution 
is assumed [6]. This problem also occurs in a classical MIPv6 
deployment without any geographically distributed HAs, as 
the scalability factor is the number of MNs. 
Considering only a single shared key between all MNs and 
HAs, the scalability problem vanishes but a security problem 
arises if one of the MNs becomes compromised. This 
malicious node could use the identity of someone else (e.g. by 
faking the content of the Mobile Node Identifier Option) for 
any purpose when conducting an attack. Additionally, a new 
shared key has to be distributed among all HAs and MNs to 
counter this threat, as soon as the attack has been recognized. 
Our proposal is supposed to address these deficiencies, but 
before continuing we first want to define the security and 
scalability requirements for our solution. 
 
IV. GOALS 
Our goals for securing the DHAAD mechanism are the 
following: 
• It shall be possible to authenticate the sender of the 
request message (valid MN). 
• Replay attacks with an old request message shall be 
prevented. 
• It shall be possible to provide integrity protection for the 
response message 
• It shall be possible to authenticate the sender of the 
response message (valid HA) 
• Replay attacks with an old response message shall be 
prevented. 
• The approach should be scalable to a high number of 
MNs and HAs. 
Therefore, we propose to use mechanisms of asymmetric 
cryptography. This eliminates the scalability problem and 
allows reliable identification of every individual MN and HA. 
A similar approach was used for the Secure Neighbor 
Discovery (SEND) protocol, which we are going to present 
shortly. 
 
V. SECURE NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY 
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) as specified in [11] 
is used by hosts and routers in IPv6 networks alike to learn the 
local topology. Among others, this is done by building an IP 
to MAC address mapping (based on Neighbor Solicitations 
and Neighbor Advertisements) and by learning the prefixes 
advertised by the routers on the local link (based on Router 
Advertisements (RAs)). NDP suffers from several 
vulnerabilities that were identified in [12]. To counter these 
threats, the SEcure Neighbor Discovery Protocol [2] has been 
defined where a zero-configuration mechanism proves the 
(link local) IP address-ownership of individual nodes and 
access routers are certified by a trust anchor, the latter 
requiring a PKI infrastructure covering both MNs and routers. 
The two probably most significant parts of SEND are 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) and 
certificates that authorize access routers to advertise a certain 
subnet prefix. Both mechanisms are of interest for securing the 
DHAAD procedure. 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses [3] take a 64-bit 
subnet prefix, the public key of the address owner and 
auxiliary parameters as input to an algorithm. This algorithm 
then generates the 64 bit interface identifier that is finally 
concatenated with the 64 bit subnet prefix to form the 128 bit 
IPv6 address of a node. This way the IPv6 address is 
cryptographically bound to the public key of the address 
owner and cannot be regenerated by any other public key (or 
more precisely, the probability for being able to generate the 
same CGA with a different public key is very low). The 
association of a CGA to a certain public key can be verified by 
any node that knows the public key, the values of the auxiliary 
parameters used for generation as well as the address itself. 
These parameters are carried within a CGA Option that is 
shown in Fig. 1. 
Additionally, the sender signs the associated message with a 
RSA signature by using the complementary private key that 
was used to generate the CGA. The RSA Signature option – 
shown in Fig. 1 – has a key hash field that contains the most 
significant 128 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the public key that 
was used to generate the signature. This value will usually 
correspond to the public key that is carried within the CGA 
option of the same message. The Digital Signature field 
contains the signature value itself that is generated with the 
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm and SHA-1 hash as defined 
in [14]. 
The receiver of the protected message can then verify the 
message’s authenticity primarily based on the RSA signature, 
while also using the CGA data structure. The receiver obtains 
this information (Signature and CGA data structure) by means 
of in-band signaling with the Neighbor Discovery message 
that has to be protected – this means that the options are 
directly attached to the message that has to be protected. 
CGAs themselves do not have to be certified and do not rely 
on a public key infrastructure, hence attackers can use an 
arbitrary public key (e.g. of someone else) and generate a 
CGA from it. However, it is not possible for this attacker to 
take ownership of someone else’s CGA for use in SEND as he 
cannot sign messages (generating a valid RSA Signature 
option) due to the missing complementary private key. As 
already mentioned before, searching for a public key that 
generates the same address is a brute force attack, which 
cannot be considered as a serious threat. 
In more detail, the sending/verification process of a 
protected message is as follows: the sender of the message to 
be protected, either host or router, uses the CGA as source 
address, generates and attaches the CGA and RSA signature 
options and sends the message to its recipient. The receiver 
first verifies the claimed CGA (taken from the CGA option) as 
specified in Section 5 of [3], basically generating a SHA-1 
value and performing simple comparison operations. If this 
verification is successful, the CGA is considered to be valid. 
The next step involves the more time consuming 
cryptographic check of the signature that verifies the message 
content and asserts that the sender is also the CGA owner (that 
is, the RSA signature was generated from the private key that 
complements the public key that was used to generate the 
CGA). Only if both checks are completed successfully the 
message can be considered as authentic. 
 
 
Fig. 1. CGA (left side) and RSA Signature (right side) options 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. DHAAD Request (left side) and Response (right side) messages. 
Original fields in grey, new parts in white. 
Authenticating a Router Advertisement requires additional 
mechanisms as CGAs only protect addresses but not prefixes. 
It has to be ensured that the sending node is authorized to act 
as a router and can advertise a certain set of prefixes. For this 
reason RAs contain Router Authorization Certificates that are 
rooted in a trust anchor. The private key used to generate the 
RSA signature for the RA is the one that complements the 
public key contained in the Router Authorization Certificate. 
These certificates are X.509v3 certificates that contain X.509 
IP address extensions that specify which subnet prefix a router 
is authorized to advertise. 
 
VI. MESSAGES AND OPTIONS 
We provide an overview of all messages, options and 
certificates that we are going to use and modify. For a better 
understanding these messages and options are shown in 
Figures 1 and 2. The original DHAAD Request and Response 
messages from [9] are the grey parts shown in Fig. 2. The 
relevant parts of SEND that we are going to use to protect the 
signaling are the CGA and RSA signature options shown in 
Fig. 1, the Timestamp option and the Certificate option 
containing a X.509v3 certificate for either MN or HA. A 
structural sketch of a X.509v3 certificate is shown in Fig. 3. 
Both DHAAD request and response are extended with these 
options introduced by SEND. Both can be seen in Fig. 2 
where they are represented with the new additional options 
appended to the original DHAAD messages. 
The Timestamp option contains the current time and date, 
expressed in number of seconds since January 1, 1970, 00:00 
UTC. 
The CGA option contains all necessary information to allow 
a recipient to verify the CGA itself and the RSA signature of 
subsequent messages. It includes the public key, the subnet 
prefix and the modifiers used for CGA generation. 
The RSA signature consists of the 128 bit SHA-1 hash of 
the public key that is transported with the CGA option as well 
as a variable length field for the signature itself that is used for 
the integrity check. 
The MN/MR/HA Certificate options contain X.509v3 
certificates [8] that have a variable length dependent on the 
implemented extensions.  
In the following a short overview of the X.509v3 certificate 
is given. The version field indicates the version (either 1, 2, or 
3). The serial number is a unique identifier of the certificate 
relative to the certificate issuer. The signature indicates the 
algorithm identifier of the algorithm used to calculate the 
digital signature on the certificate. The issuer field contains a 
name of the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the 
certificate and must always be present. In the validity field the 
time window that this certificate should be considered valid 
unless revoked is given. The subject indicates the name of the 
certificate owner and must not be null unless an alternate 
name form is used. The subject public key info contains the 
public key and the algorithm identifier of the associated 
subject and must always be present. The issuer and subject 
unique ID fields are optional and are usually not present in 
certificates. At the end of the certificate several extensions 
may be appended. The very last field contains an algorithm 
identifier and the signature that is generated by the issuer. It is 
calculated over all previous fields. 
Similarly, the public key inside the CGA option (cf. Fig. 1) 
is also stored in a field of type subject public key info. 
For the Router Authorization Certificate (that we reuse as 
Home Agent Certificate) a X.509v3 extension is necessary. 
[10] specifies extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers. 
For our purposes only the IP address extension is of interest. 
In this case prefixes are bound to the subject of the certificate. 
The length of X.509v3 certificates varies dependent on the 
entries within the general fields and the specific extensions. 
Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the size of a certificate. 
However, in general we can assume that the system 
deployment will be conducted in a favorable way, which 
means that the certificate will be kept small if bandwidth is an 
issue. Currently certificates have a typical length of 
approximately 1100 bytes and more, dependent on the number 
of extensions present in a specific certificate. Therefore, we 
assume such a size as reasonable. 
X.509 certificates are already in use in the aviation 
environment and are expected to be even more used in the 
future. We therefore think that it is valid to propose their 
usage in this environment that we are mainly targeting. 
 
VII. SECURE DHAAD 
TABLE I 
SIZE OF MESSAGES AND OPTIONS 
Message / Option Size in Bits 
DHAAD Request Message [9] 320 + 32 + 64  
DHAAD Response Message [9] 
320 + 32 + 64 + 128 * 
#(HAs) = 416 + 128 * 
#(HAs) 
Timestamp Option [2] 128 
CGA Option [3,2] 232 + ~100 + 1024 
MN Certificate Option (estimated) 32 + ~8800 
HA Certificate Option (estimated) 32 + ~8960 
RSA Signature Option [2] 160 + 1024 
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Fig. 3. X.509v3 certificate structure [1]. 
The Mobile Node constructs the basic DHAAD Request 
message as defined in [9], with the source address being a 
CGA based Care-of-Address. Additionally, a Timestamp 
option (same format as in [2]) is attached with the current time. 
The MN also adds the CGA option, a Certificate option 
(comparable to the Router Authorization Certificate but 
without the IP address extensions), and a RSA Signature 
option whose signature is calculated over the source and 
destination address and the ICMP DHAAD request message. 
The public key in the CGA option must be the same as in the 
Certificate option, and the latter must have an issuer/trust 
anchor that is known by the receiving HA and is signed by this 
entity. The final message can be seen in Fig. 2. 
Once the message was constructed, it is sent to the Mobile 
IPv6 Home-Agents Anycast address for its home subnet prefix, 
which is a /64 (in the case of [9]) or a shorter prefix covering 
all HAs (in the case of Global HA to HA [15]). This prefix 
was learned from the bootstrapping process [7, 4] (also 
explained in Section  II) that would have to be extended in 
order to provide this information. 
Due to the semantics of Anycast, the HA closest to the MNs 
current point of attachment will receive the request message 
and start verifying it. The first, computationally cheap, steps 
consist of checking whether the issuer of the MN’s certificate 
is a known trust anchor, whether the public key in the CGA 
option is equal to the one in the Certificate option, and 
whether the time in the Timestamp option is not too old (e.g. 
should not deviate from the current time by 1.5 seconds) in 
order to disallow replay attacks. The next steps involve the 
verification of the CGA (whether it was generated from the 
provided public key), the signature verification of the issuer 
on the MN’s certificate, and the verification of the RSA 
signature. If any of these steps fails, the message is dropped 
and ignored. 
In case all checks have been successfully passed the 
message is considered valid and the HA prepares an 
appropriate response message. It is constructed with the fields 
set as in [9], but in addition has a Certificate option with a 
X.509v3 certificate (comparable to the Router Authorization 
Certificate in SEND) with an IP address delegation extension 
that includes the Home Network Prefix of the MN or a prefix 
that aggregates the Home Network Prefix. The issuer must be 
a trust anchor that is common to the MN and HA. The 
Timestamp option from the request message is copied to the 
response. This way the timestamp acts as a kind of nonce that 
matches the request and therefore protects against replay 
attacks, as an attacker can not reply with any previously 
eavesdropped or intercepted response that was sent to another 
MN. Finally, a RSA Signature option is appended that is 
generated from the private key of the HA (that complements 
the public key in the attached certificate), calculated over the 
source and destination address, the ICMP header, the field 
containing the HA address(es), and the Timestamp option of 
the message. 
This response (shown in Fig. 2) is sent from the HA to the 
MN, that in turn performs the following checks: it validates 
that the HA certificate has a known issuer and that the prefix 
contained in the IP address extension of this certificate is 
equal to the Home Network Prefix of the MN (or is at least an 
aggregation thereof). 
Then it is verified that the value of the Timestamp option 
matches the one that was sent with the request message. 
Finally the signature of the issuer in the router certificate and 
the RSA Signature option are validated. 
In case of a positive validation, the MN extracts the Home 
Agent addresses and uses one of them to establish an IPsec 
Security Association (SA). Afterwards Binding Updates are 
exchanged via the SA with this HA. 
 
VIII. MESSAGE SIZES 
In our secured DHAAD proposal, these messages have 
significantly improved security, mainly due to the public keys 
and certificates. However, a disadvantage of this suggestion is 
the increase of the message sizes. In the original version of 
MIPv6, DHAAD request and response messages have a size 
of 52 and 68 bytes each (including the IPv6 header), assuming 
a single Home Agent listed in the response message. The 
compared message sizes are based on the values provided in 
Table I. We have assumed public key sizes of 1024 bits and 
have not taken into account the padding bits that are usually 
used at the end of an option to meet the 32bit alignment 
requirement. 
The request now consists of the original message (52 byte) 
with a timestamp (16 byte), a CGA (170 byte), a (MN) 
Certificate option (1104 bytes), and the RSA signature (148 
bytes): 52+16+170+1104+148 = 1490 bytes. 
The response message consists of the original response (68 
bytes) with a timestamp (16 bytes), a (HA) Certificate option 
(1124 bytes) and a RSA signature option (148 bytes): 
68+16+1124+40 = 1356 bytes. 
Based on that observation it becomes apparent that such a 
mechanism is only well suited for networks which do not have 
too stringent bandwidth constraints. The message sizes are 
still below the common IEEE maximum transmission unit of 
1500 bytes that is common for many access technologies. 
However, it should also be noted that this message exchange 
only takes place once in a while. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a possible way of securing DHAAD by 
means of asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms as defined in 
SEND. The MN constructs the DHAAD request with several 
additional options (Timestamp, CGA, Certificate and RSA 
Signature) that allows the receiving HA to verify the 
authenticity of the sender. Similarly, the HA sends a response 
message (with Timestamp, HA Certificate and RSA Signature) 
where the MN is able to verify the authenticity and integrity of 
the response message. 
The advantage is that a HA will only respond to requests 
that are coming from a valid MN – that means, a Mobile Node 
that has a certificate from a common trust anchor. Replay 
attacks with DHAAD requests are not possible due to the 
Timestamp option that gives messages only a certain lifetime. 
The same holds for the response message as it has to include 
the timestamp of the request, making sure that responses 
intercepted by an attacker can not be replayed. 
While asymmetric encryption provides strong protection, it 
is also a disadvantage at the same time as the computational 
overhead for verifying RSA signatures is significant and can 
be exploited for Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS). This 
vulnerability is also present for SEND, however, there it is 
limited to the on-link location – the attacker has to be on the 
same subnet as the victim in order to launch his attacks. 
However, in our secured DHAAD an attacker can be at any 
location of the overall internetwork for as long as there is a 
route between him and the victim (HA).  
To minimize this vulnerability, the verification of the 
DHAAD request at the HA is a two-stage process. The first 
check – verification of the CGA – is computationally 
inexpensive and forces the attacker to generate a valid CGA, 
which is a resource expensive task for the attacker himself. In 
addition the MN also needs a valid certificate, issued and 
signed by a common trust anchor. Only if the CGA is valid, 
the signatures of the MN’s certificate and the RSA option are 
checked, too. 
The threat to the MN is minimal as it will only attempt to 
verify response messages that have both an Identifier value 
(stored in the corresponding field shown in Fig. 2 according to 
[9]) and a Timestamp option (introduced by our new proposal) 
that equal those that were used in the original request message. 
An attacker would have to be on the communication path 
between MN and HA while the request is sent, learn of the 
Identifier and Timestamp options by eavesdropping and send a 
forged reply that uses these two values. Only under this 
precondition an attacker can force the MN into verifying the 
certificate and RSA signature. 
The proposed mechanism is not providing any 
confidentiality; hence it is still possible for an eavesdropper to 
learn the addresses of HA(s) in the home network. However, 
this is possible through other means as well e.g. the MN 
established an IKE Security Association with the HA where 
destination address (HA address) is readable by everyone on 
the path. Hence, the current security provided by other parts of 
MIPv6 is not reduced by our proposed mechanism. 
The overhead caused by our proposed security scheme 
could be reduced if the CGA Option would allow a carriage of 
the complete certificate of the MN (instead of the public key 
only). This way the additional Certificate option for the 
request message (as shown in Fig. 2) could be removed. 
However, this would require a modification of the existing 
CGA and SEND specifications [3, 2]. 
The remaining problem is the availability of a public/private 
key pair at the MN that has to be signed by the common trust 
anchor/certificate authority. It will usually be the case that 
devices are already preconfigured with certain information 
and an additional public/private key pair and certificates 
should not incur a significant burden, as this is independent to 
mobility and IP address configuration. In the aviation 
environment certificates are already partially in use and are 
considered as even more important in the future. Hence we 
think that this is not a problem from the deployment point of 
view. 
In the future we will provide algorithm agility (instead of 
just reusing SEND functionality with hardcoded RSA and 
SHA-1) within our proposal so that we can also use elliptic 
curve cryptography that provides higher cryptographic 
strength with shorter key lengths when compared to RSA. 
This also helps reducing the message sizes that are a 
significant problem within low bandwidth environments. At 
the same time this also addresses the problem of attacks that 
have been reported on SHA-1 in the past, as we could rely on 
a different hash algorithm.  
Simple digital signatures that allow for fast screening could 
also help mitigating the CPU exhaustion attacks. The next 
steps also involve an implementation of the proposed scheme 
that allows us to investigate the problems of DoS attacks in 
more detail. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Adams C. and Lloyd S “Understanding PKI” 2nd Edition, 2002 
[2] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor 
Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005. 
[3] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC 3972, 
March 2005. 
[4] Chowdhury, K. and A. Yegin, "MIP6-bootstrapping via DHCPv6 for the 
Integrated Scenario", draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-integrated-dhc-05 
(work in progress), June 2006. 
[5] Devarapalli, V., Wakikawa, R., Petrescu, A., and P. Thubert, "Network 
Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support Protocol", RFC 3963, January 2005. 
[6] Eurocontrol, Statistics and Forecast Service (STATFOR), “Long-Term 
Forecast. Flight Movements 2006-2025”, Edition Number 1, December 
2006. 
[7] Giaretta, G., Ed., J. Kempf and V. Devarapalli, Ed., "Mobile IPv6 
bootstrapping in split scenario", RFC 5026, October 2007. 
[8] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public 
Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002. 
[9] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in IPv6", RFC 
3775, June 2004. 
[10] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, “X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and 
AS Identifiers”, RFC 3779, June 2004. 
[11] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor 
Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, September 2007. 
[12] Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E.  Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery 
(ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756, May 2004. 
[13] H. Petander, K. Lan, M. Hassan, S. Qian, M. Lei, "On securing dynamic 
home agent address discovery of on-board mobile router in mobile IPv6 
networks", 12th International conference on telecommunications, IEEE, 
New Jersey, USA, 2005. 
[14] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1", PKCS 
         1, November 2002. 
[15] Thubert, P., Wakikawa R., and V. Devarapalli, “Global HA to HA 
protocol”, draft-thubert-mext-global-haha-00, (work in progress), March 
2008. 
